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9Military operations are major industrial activities that use massive amounts of fuel 
and materials that significantly con-
tribute to climate change. In this ar-
ticle, we assert that military activity 
to protect international oil trade is a 
direct production component for im-
porting foreign oil— as necessary for 
imports as are pipelines and super-
tankers—and therefore the green-
house gas (GHG) emissions from 
that military activity are relevant to 
U.S. fuel policies related to climate 
change. Military security for protec-
tion of global maritime petroleum 
distribution is part of the acquisition 
process, but in addition, recent Mid-
dle Eastern wars may also be related 
to securing petroleum reserves. 
A component of U.S. motor fuel 
policy has been to encourage the de-
velopment of biofuels as substitutes 
for petroleum, both to reduce de-
pendence on foreign oil and to re-
duce GHG emissions. To qualify for 
this substitution under the U.S. En-
ergy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 (EISA), specific biofuel types 
must reduce GHG emissions by set 
amounts from 20 to 60 percent com-
pared with gasoline. The EISA leg-
islation demands evaluation of not 
only direct life cycle emissions from 
biofuels, but also all potentially sig-
nificant indirect emissions. Yet the 
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gasoline emissions against which 
this is compared consist only of di-
rect life cycle emissions, which to 
this point have not included emis-
sions due to the military compo-
nent of transporting foreign oil to 
the United States. These military 
emissions are analyzed here to de-
termine their contribution to the life 
cycle GHG emissions from gasoline 
production. This analysis builds on a 
recent estimate that emissions from 
military security raised the GHG in-
tensity of U.S. gasoline derived from 
Middle Eastern imports by twofold 
compared with direct emissions.1 
Direct GHG emissions from the 
production of biofuels are becom-
ing better understood after years 
of scientific controversy.2 Unfortu-
nately, the process of setting regu-
latory GHG emissions standards for 
fuels is complicated by poorly un-
derstood indirect GHG emissions 
that result from the production of 
both biofuels and gasoline.3 A sig-
nificant but elusive indirect compo-
nent of biofuel emissions are those 
resulting from international land use 
change caused by increased com-
modity prices due to biofuel pro-
duction. These indirect emissions 
have been difficult to quantify be-
cause they result from complex mar-
ket-driven ripple effects that are pro-
jected into an uncertain future.4 Yet 
in comparing biofuel emissions with 
those from gasoline, current regula-
tory analysis excludes indirect emis-
sions from gasoline and neglects mil-
itary security emissions that should 
be considered to directly result from 
oil consumption. In order to have a 
balanced assessment of the climate 
change impacts of substituting bio-
fuels for gasoline, a comparison of 
all direct and indirect emissions 
from both types of fuel is required. 
The analysis presented here contrib-
utes to a more complete assessment 
of total GHG emissions related to 
gasoline use, by including emissions 
from military activities related to the 
protection and acquisition of foreign 
crude oil. 
The United States is truly “ad-
dicted to oil.” To maintain the cur-
rent fuel supply, the United States 
imports 11 million barrels per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(mb/d) of crude oil and refined pe-
troleum products (net imports), 
which is 57 percent of the 19.4 
mb/d of petroleum consumed in 
the United States in 2008.5 Roughly 
half of imports and 31 percent of 
consumption are imported from 
member states of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) cartel. Imports from 
the Persian Gulf in the Middle East 
supplied 18 percent of total imports 
(2.37 mb/d) and constituted 12 per-
cent of crude oil used in the United 
States in 2008. Of the petroleum 
products used in the U.S. market, 46 
percent was in the form of gasoline. 
Supertankers transport more than 
half of globally traded crude oil, 
and the majority of oil imports to 
the United States arrive via four su-
pertankers per day.6 But this mari-
time “pipeline” is not free from se-
rious threats. Pirates off the Horn of 
Africa from Somalia, terrorists, and 
“rogue” states provide strong justi-
fication for the United States to pro-
tect oil transportation from volatile 
regions of the world to the United 
States and Europe. Some maritime 
transit routes are particularly hostile 
and have had a history of disruption, 
including the Strait of Hormuz, the 
Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aden, 
among others (see Figure 1). In 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
alone, roughly 100 oil tankers were 
attacked around the world.7 In this 
article, we estimate the total GHG 
emissions from military activity re-
lated to petroleum. Our analysis first 
estimates total GHG emissions from 
the U.S. military, then considers how 
military activities are related to oil 
transport and acquisition, and what 
fraction of these emissions should be 
attributed to gasoline. 
GHG Emissions from U.S. 
Military Activity in the 
Persian Gulf 
Following the principles of life 
cycle assessment (LCA), we evalu-
ate military emissions from both di-
rect fuel consumption and upstream 
emissions related to the manufacture 
of materials and equipment pro-
cured for military activities. Because 
conventional military security and 
activities for the Iraq War have dif-
ferent relationships to oil, we esti-
mate emissions from those two cate-
gories separately. 
We first estimate the amount of 
emissions from conventional mil-
itary activity (excluding the Iraq 
War), then later estimate the frac-
tion attributable to oil-related ac-
An oil tanker anchored at a refinery in Japan.  Wikimedia Commons/Mohan R. 
securing foreign oil: military operations & climate change impact of fuels 11
tivities. The U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Agency (EIA) reports that total 
conventional energy use by the U.S. 
military in 2008 was 889 trillion 
British thermal units (Btu), the ma-
jority of which was from petroleum 
products, but also included consid-
erable amounts of electricity and 
natural gas. We use estimates of av-
erage emissions from each of these 
categories to calculate total emis-
sions from this energy use, which 
amounts to about 85 million met-
ric tons (MMt) of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) (see Table 1). We 
estimate that an additional 87 MMt 
was emitted in connection with 
manufacturing of materials, equip-
ment, military infrastructure, ve-
hicles, and munitions. Recent esti-
mates of the GHG emissions from 
manufacture of these categories are 
unavailable, but emissions are cer-
tainly sizable given that 14.4 per-
cent of U.S. industrial employ-
ment was in the defense industry in 
1992.8 Employment in the defense 
industry is predominantly in the 
southern “Gunbelt” states of Cali-
fornia, Texas, and Florida.9 Expen-
ditures on military acquisitions to-
taled about $246 billion in 2009, and 
the EIA reports an emissions fac-
tor of 0.300 million tons of CO2e per 
billion dollars of goods produced 
in the manufacturing sector. We as-
sume that this intensity also applies 
to military acquisitions, which re-
sults in the estimate of 87 MMt of 
emissions resulting from the man-
ufacturing of 2009 military acqui-
sitions. Together, emissions from 
conventional military fuel use and 
acquisitions total about 172 MMt of 
CO2e per year. This implies an in-
tensity factor of 0.289 MMt of CO2e 
per billion dollars of conventional 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
expenditures. 
According to a recent U.S. Con-
gressional Research Service report, 
the average annual cost of the Iraq 
War has been $93.5 billion. (Alter-
natively, the full monetary cost of 
Figure 1. Global supply of U.S. crude oil imports, global oil reserves, maritime oil transit choke points, and the Area of Re-
sponsibility for U.S. Central Command. Countries in gray export oil to the U.S. at >0.2 mb/d or have >20 billion barrels of oil 
reserves. Country labels in parentheses indicate: 1) U.S. imports designated in mb/d, 2) oil reserves in billion barrels, and 3) 
the percentage of global reserves. Oil shipping rates at maritime choke points are for 2006. 
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/
World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html     (accessed 11 February 2010); Reserves from U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/EIA-0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), p. 313; Imports from U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_ mbblpd_a.htm  (ac-
cessed 15 February 2010). 
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the Iraq War was projected by Sti-
glitz and Bilmes (2008) to range be-
tween $2.7 to $5 trillion dollars, 
including more complete “reset-
ting” of military infrastructure and 
other indirect costs such as veter-
ans’ healthcare.10) As there is no ad-
ditional information on the compo-
sition of these war expenditures, 
we utilize the 0.289 intensity fac-
tor calculated for conventional mil-
itary expenditures to approximate 
the emissions related to the war at 
27 MMt per year. (We suspect that 
war expenditures are more heav-
ily weighted toward high-emission 
items such as fuel, munitions, ve-
hicles, and concrete than conven-
tional military expenditures, but we 
have no data that would support 
calculation of a separate intensity 
for war expenditures.) In addition 
to the kinds of emissions embodied 
in the 0.289 intensity factor, Reisch 
and Kretzmann (2008) have noted 
a number of additional emissions 
due to the war.11 These emissions 
include extra supply chain fuel, ce-
ment for war installations and re-
pair of war-damaged infrastructure, 
well fires and flaring that occur dur-
ing wartime, and fuel for troop de-
ployment. Adding these emissions, 
we estimate the annual emissions 
related to the war to be 43.3 MMt 
CO2e. 
To determine the relevance of 
these emissions to U.S. gasoline con-
sumption, we now turn to the more 
difficult issue of connecting the mil-
itary activity to gasoline use in the 
United States.  
Table 1. Estimation of U.S. Military Life Cycle GHG Emissions
  Estimated GHG
  Emissions,
Emissions category  Calculations  Million Mt CO2e
Direct conventional fuel use by militarya
Total DOD conventional energy use, 2008 —
    Petroleum use—67% jet fuel  696 trillion Btu ×  61.7
 (0.0691 MMt CO2e per trillion Btu
b) 
    Electricity use—primary 1 01 trillion Btu ×  18.9
 (0.0600 MMt CO2e per trillion Btu
b)
    Natural gas and other  93 trillion Btu ×  4.7
 (0.0504 MMt CO2e per trillion Btu
b)
Upstream emissions
    Conventional expenditures for  ($246c expenditure) ×  86.8
        acquisitions and infrastructure, 2009c  (0.300 MMt CO2e per $billion in 2002 dollars)
Total conventional GHG emissions per year   172
Implied conventional DoD emissions factor  (172 MMt CO2e)/  0.289
   (MMT CO2e per billion dollars)  ($595 billion DoD expenditures in 2009)
Average annual direct U.S. emissions  ($93.5 billion annual expenditured) × 
   due to the Iraq War  (0.289 MMt CO2e /$b))  27.0
Annual indirect emissions related to the
   Iraq Ware   16.3
Total annual emissions related to the Iraq War   43.3
Sources: 
a EIA (2009)5, p. 29, 40, 349.
b Average GHG intensities for transportation, electricity, and industrial sectors, from top to bottom from note 5, p. 40, 
349; Military electricity use is divided by 0.32 to account for losses in generation and transmission from note 5, p.42–43; 
Petroleum use was divided by 0.78 to include energy used for production and refining from note 11.
c Expenditures for acquisitions and installations62, Tables 1 and 2; emissions factor from EIA (2009)5 (T.12.4, p. 353), corrected 
to 2009 dollars (T.D1, p. 383).
d Average FY03-FY09, as reported63, Table 1.
e Emissions beyond those calculated in the emissions per dollar factor. Includes supply chain fuel, troop deployment, cement, 
well fires and flaring.11
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Oil Production Trends, the 
Economy, and U.S. Military 
Activity in the Persian Gulf 
A number of considerations sup-
port the contention that a consider-
able portion of conventional mili-
tary activity, and even the Iraq War 
itself, has been for the purpose of se-
curing access to Persian Gulf petro-
leum supplies and maintaining a 
low petroleum price for U.S. mar-
kets. After World War II, discov-
ery of oil in the Middle East and de-
clining British influence stimulated 
more regional U.S. involvement. In 
1945, the U.S. military established 
an air base at Dhahran, Saudi Ara-
bia, as a first step for securing oil 
from the region.12 By 1979, the Ira-
nian Revolution and the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan led the U.S. 
military to take more aggressive 
steps to build a military infrastruc-
ture in the region in order to ensure 
the flow of oil. The Carter Doctrine 
(1980) explicitly established the Mid-
dle East and its oil supply as “vital 
interests” of the U.S. economy and 
explicitly threatened military force 
to protect the area from regional ad-
versaries. The military buildup in 
the region culminated in 1983 with 
the formation of U.S. Central Com-
mand, whose objectives were to en-
sure western access to oil, maintain 
regional stability, and deter Soviet 
influence (Figure 1).13 The U.S. mil-
itary now protects global maritime 
transit routes for oil, although with 
primary focus on the Persian Gulf. 
Peak Oil and the U.S. Economy 
There are now growing concerns 
that global production of easily ac-
cessible oil is nearing its maximum 
rate.14 Global oil production is domi-
nated by giant oil fields with the 500 
largest fields contributing over 60 
percent of production.15 In 2008, 580 
of the 651 largest oil fields globally 
were reported to have passed their 
peak production rate and are now 
producing an average of about 5–6 
percent less oil each year.16 Based 
on these findings, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in 2008 stated 
“the era of cheap oil is over.”17 
Based on decline rates, global oil 
production is predicted by research-
ers at Uppsala University in Swe-
den to decline from 84 mb/d (in-
cluding natural gas liquids) in 2007 
to roughly 76 mb/d by 2030.18 Alter-
natively, official estimates from the 
IEA optimistically anticipate that to-
tal liquid petroleum production (in-
cluding natural gas liquids and un-
conventional sources) will continue 
to increase through 2030, reach-
ing a level 20 percent higher than 
current levels (see Figure 2).19 The 
U.S. Department of Energy antici-
pates an increase over this period of 
about 15 percent. According to the 
IEA, the share of global production 
from OPEC countries will rise from 
46 percent in 2007 to 56 percent in 
2030. Saudi Arabia is projected to re-
main the world’s largest producer 
throughout the period, its output in-
creasing from 10.2 mb/d in 2007 to 
15.6 mb/d in 2030. Yet, Saudi Ara-
bia produced only 7.9 mb/d in 2009 
due to OPEC production cuts to 
maintain oil prices during the global 
recession.20 
From 2000 to 2030, the largest 
gains in petroleum production are 
projected to come from two key re-
gions: the Middle East and Central 
Asia (see Table 2). In fact, 94 percent 
of increases in production over this 
period are expected to come from 
10 nations, with Iraq and Kazakh-
stan as two of the top four coun-
tries with the largest production in-
crease—both are connected to U.S. 
military operations. Increasing pro-
duction of nonconventional sources 
of petroleum such as oil (tar) sands 
from Canada will also help maintain 
petroleum supply. Oil sands could 
contribute as much as 20 percent of 
the U.S. gasoline supply by 2020.21 
Increasing oil demand driven 
by developing economies such 
as China, along with declining or 
slower increases in production, will 
cause oil prices to climb. The aver-
age oil price projected in 2008 for 
the period 2008–2015 is $100 per 
barrel, which is significantly higher 
than the roughly $20 per barrel aver-
age oil price over the past half cen-
tury. By 2030, both the IEA and EIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Historical global production of crude oil and the contribution from the 
Middle East, with projections to 2030, in million barrels per day. Global crude oil 
(red), crude oil plus natural gas liquids (green), and the contribution of the Persian 
Gulf (blue). Persian Gulf projection from 2015 and 2030 are for crude oil plus NGL. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/ EIA-
0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), pp. 315, 317; Projections from International Energy 
Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris, France: OECD/IEA, 2008), p. 251. 
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project oil to reach $170–190 per bar-
rel in nominal dollars ($115–$130 in 
2008 dollars).22 Some suggest, how-
ever, that the recent oil price spike 
in 2008 to $147 per barrel (com-
pared to roughly $80 per barrel in 
March 2010) has stimulated greater 
conservation and adaptation, which 
may keep oil prices relatively lower 
in the near term due to reduced de-
mand.23 The current global recession 
has temporarily reduced demand for 
oil, and it is difficult to know how 
quickly this impact will fade. 
The cost of importing foreign 
oil to the U.S. will continue to in-
crease along with projected in-
creases in oil prices (see Figure 3). 
In 2007 with oil at $70 dollars per 
barrel, the U.S. trade deficit in pe-
troleum products was $293 billion, 
or 36 percent of the total trade def-
icit of $819 billion.24 The high oil 
prices of 2008 transferred a record 
of nearly $1 trillion dollars to mem-
bers of OPEC.25 Regarding the pros-
pects for such transfers in the future, 
consider that the national oil com-
panies in OPEC member states and 
other countries (e.g., Saudi Aramco 
and National Iranian Oil Company) 
control approximately 90 percent of 
the world’s oil reserves and 75 per-
cent of global oil production; similar 
numbers apply for natural gas.26 On 
the other hand, the reserves of major 
international oil companies (such as 
Exxon-Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Chev-
ron, BP, and Shell) were projected in 
2004 by the U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission to be depleted by 2015–2017, 
if their reserves are not expanded.27 
If the oil supply were disrupted, 
accompanying price spikes would 
lead to significant negative impacts 
on the global economy.28 While the 
interrelationships between the busi-
ness cycle and petroleum price are 
complicated and not easily resolved, 
Brown and Huntington report that 
10 of the 11 U.S. recessions since 
World War II have been preceded 
by significant oil price spikes.29 The 
relationships between oil price and 
the health of the economy suggest 
that maintaining low and stable oil 
prices is a political imperative asso-
ciated with modern petroleum-fu-
eled economies. 
Military professionals recognize 
the significance of these changes 
in the oil economy for military pre-
paredness. Professors at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School re-
cently stated, “The idea of peak oil 
is already becoming established as 
a subtext or unspoken assumption 
among strategists and policymak-
ers …,” and it was further noted that 
“The possibility that access to en-
ergy resources may become an ob-
ject of large-scale armed struggle is 
Table 2. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Liquids Production and Projections Regionally and for Selected 
Countries
Regional Oil Production
                                              2000            2007          2015       2030                               Δ2000–2030
                                                                                          mb/d                                                                  %
Middle East-OPEC*  21.3  22.3  30.3  37.1  15.8  74
Central Asia  8.1  12.9  14.3  16.5  8.4  104
Non-Middle East-OPEC§  10.7  12.2  13.6  15  4.3  40
Latin America  3.2  3.5  5.0  4.5  1.3  41
Asia  5.6  6.4  5.8  5.1  –0.5  –9
North America  13.3  12.5  11.1  11.4  –1.9  –14
Europe  6.8  4.9  3.3  2.1  –4.7  –69
Countries—Highest Increases
Saudi Arabia  9.3  10.2  14.4  15.6  6.3  68
Canada (oil sands only)  0.6  1.2  3.3  5.9  5.3  883
Iraq  2.6  2.1  3.0  6.4  3.8  146
Kazakhstan  0.7  1.4  2.4  4.3  3.6  514
Brazil  1.3  1.8  3.5  3.4  2.1  162
Angola  0.7  1.7  2.3  2.6  1.9  271
Iran  3.8  4.4  4.5  5.4  1.6  42
Nigeria  2.2  2.3  3.4  3.7  1.5  68
Kuwait  2.2  2.6  2.9  3.3  1.1  50
Venezuela  3.1  2.6  2.7  3.6  0.5  16
* Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
§ Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela.
Source: International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 (Paris, France: OECD/IEA, 2008), pp. 267, 272.
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almost incontestably the single most 
alarming prospect facing the inter-
national system today.”30 
Oil and the Iraq War 
Many reasons may have led 
the United States to invade Iraq in 
2003. Initially, the Bush adminis-
tration asserted that national secu-
rity concerns were primary. Threats 
from Iraq included the potential ex-
istence of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) (justification 1) and 
Iraq’s possible support of terror-
ism, as viewed after post–Septem-
ber 11, 2001 (justification 2). Based 
on the Downing Street memo, it 
now appears that the U.S. adminis-
tration had already decided to in-
vade Iraq by July 23, 2002, prior to 
the re-entry of U.N. weapons inspec-
tors back into the country and be-
fore the WMD threat could be eval-
uated.31 In February 2003, the month 
immediately preceding the U.S. in-
vasion, the U.S. administration as-
serted that democratization of Iraq 
was another reason for invasion 
(justification 3) and would foster a 
larger political transformation of the 
Middle East (justification 4).32 Fol-
lowing the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the United States was also engaged 
in an ongoing costly and unpopu-
lar sanctions campaign against Iraq 
that the administration desired to 
change (justification 5).33 To enforce 
sanctions (such as the no-fly zone), 
the United States kept military bases 
in Saudi Arabia after the end of the 
1991 conflict, against previous assur-
ances that it would leave the pen-
insula. This U.S. presence in Saudi 
Arabia agitated many Muslims, in-
cluding Osama bin Laden, due to 
the presence of “infidels in the Holy 
Land”, and likely encouraged vari-
ous terrorist attacks, including 9/11. 
These circumstances led to U.S. in-
terest in a new base in the Middle 
East outside of Saudi Arabia, such 
as Iraq (justification 6).34 Such a base 
would be needed if the United States 
wished to continue to have a strong 
military presence in the region. 
Attempts to foster regime change 
in Iraq had already been an explicit 
U.S. foreign policy since 1998.35 The 
above justifications for war have 
deep roots in the primary economic 
concern for U.S. involvement in the 
Middle East: the acquisition of oil 
from the region.36 Iraq has the third 
largest oil reserves globally at 115 
billion barrels (about 9 percent of 
global crude oil reserves), follow-
ing only Saudi Arabia and Iran in 
size, and some evidence suggests 
that Iraq’s reserves may be larger 
than twice the proven amount.37 Re-
gime change was thought to enable 
Iraq to produce more oil and make 
the United States less dependent on 
Saudi Arabia.38 Some have asserted 
that the U.S. government ultimately 
sought to limit Iraq’s influence over 
the Middle East and OPEC in order 
to control oil prices more favorably 
for the U.S. economy.39 
Viewed from the perspective of 
peak oil and the overwhelming ma-
jority of reserves under the control of 
national oil companies and OPEC na-
tions, and the fact that a significant 
rise in oil price could cripple the U.S. 
economy, the assertion that the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq sought to control ac-
cess to oil with the aim to control oil 
prices appears to carry substantial 
weight. There is now growing con-
sensus among economic, foreign 
policy, and military analysts that 
oil played a large part in the United 
States. led invasion of Iraq,40 even 
though official statements from the 
U.S. government deny such claims. 
In 2007, former U.S. Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan clearly ar-
ticulated the critical place of oil in the 
global economy and its relationship 
to the U.S. invasion: 
I am saddened that it is politically 
inconvenient to acknowledge what 
everyone knows: the Iraq War is 
largely about oil. Thus, projections 
of world oil supply and demand 
that do not note the highly precar-
ious environment of the Middle 
East are avoiding the eight-hun-
dred-pound gorilla that could bring 
world economic growth to a halt.41 
In hindsight, the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq has been viewed by many as a 
“war of choice” not a “war of neces-
sity.” It has been asserted that the 
Iraq invasion was a unilateral pre-
ventive war that could have been 
avoided through the use of other 
viable policy alternatives.42 When 
viewed in a historical perspective, it 
was clearly understood by U.S. mili-
tary personnel in U.S. Central Com-
mand that “the invasion of Iraq is 
Figure 3. Inflation-adjusted annual value of U.S. imports of crude oil in billions of 
dollars. Constant dollars valued in the year 2000. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008, DOE/ EIA-
0384(2008) (Washington, DC, 2009), p. 81. 
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only the latest in a series of military 
engagements in the Gulf proceeding 
from the Carter Doctrine,”43 which 
clearly places its roots in oil. 
Many documents preceding the 
U.S. invasion provide insight into 
the thinking of policymakers at the 
time. In 2001, the U.S. National En-
ergy Policy Development Group 
(NEPD) provided an energy out-
look for a country increasingly de-
pendent on Middle Eastern oil: “By 
2020, Gulf oil producers are pro-
jected to supply between 54 and 67 
percent of the world’s oil … The Gulf 
will be a primary focus of U.S. inter-
national energy policy…” and “The 
NEPD Group recommends that the 
President support initiatives by Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, the 
UAE, and other suppliers [Iraq] to 
open up areas of their energy sec-
tors to foreign investment.”44 In ad-
dition to this document, other related 
documents before the invasion indi-
cate an intense interest by the multi-
national oil companies and the Bush 
administration to gain better access to 
Middle Eastern oil. For example, the 
Bush administration discussed the lo-
gistics of a military invasion of Iraq in 
its first national security meeting in 
2001, two years before its invasion.45 
Now, after the U.S. invasion and im-
plementation of a new government, 
multinational oil companies (e.g., 
Exxon, BP) are establishing new con-
tracts in Iraq that will extend the life-
time of their companies. 
Attributing Military 
Emissions in the Persian Gulf 
to U.S. Gasoline Consumption 
Life cycle assessment (LCA) has 
incorporated two approaches to at-
tributing emissions to industrial pro-
cesses, namely, the attributional and 
consequential approaches.46 Attribu-
tional LCA is an analytical approach 
in which emissions from various 
components in a production process, 
from acquisition of raw materials to 
final product use, are inventoried and 
attributed to a single product or al-
located to one product (e.g., fuel) in 
proportion to its share of all products 
from a multiproduct system, mea-
sured alternatively in terms of the 
fraction of energy, mass, or value. 
The consequential LCA approach at-
tempts to identify the total marginal 
change in emissions that would oc-
cur as a consequence of some change 
in the output of the product. The at-
tributional approach is an account-
ing exercise, and it is not without 
its conceptual and assessment diffi-
culties. The consequential LCA ap-
proach is even more difficult, because 
in addition to the accounting assess-
ment, it demands an assessment of 
all changes in human behavior that 
would result from the change in fuel 
use, if that behavioral change would 
also result in a significant emissions 
change. Of course, it is this total im-
pact on GHG emissions that is rel-
evant to climate change and so to 
public policy, but these prospective 
changes in behavior may include 
quite distant ripple effects that are 
impossible to assess without a con-
siderable amount of judgment, given 
that it involves uncertain changes in 
human behavior, as well as the usual 
difficulties in emissions accounting. 
Attributing Military Security Emis-
sions to U.S. Gasoline 
Life cycle GHG emissions cal-
culations associated with U.S. gas-
oline production and use have in-
cluded emissions from the extraction 
and shipping of oil as well as com-
bustion, but related military security 
emissions have been omitted as di-
rect components of the production 
life cycle.47 These calculations have 
been faulty because warships are to 
oil what combine harvesters are to 
biofuels. Where combines are me-
chanical components that use fossil 
fuels to collect and deliver crops to 
produce biofuels, the military today 
is essential for collecting oil from 
distant regions and delivering it for 
gasoline production: both are direct 
supply chain operations that must 
be included in the LCA of these 
products. Recent U.S. federal law 
and government documents make 
this clear, as does common sense, 
given the clear security issues asso-
ciated with maritime oil trade today. 
The U.S. Security and Accountability 
for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 calls 
on the United States to “develop, im-
plement, and update, as appropri-
ate, a strategic plan to enhance the 
security of the international supply 
chain … [and] provide measurable 
goals, including objectives, mecha-
nisms, and a schedule, for furthering 
the security of commercial operations 
from point of origin to point of des-
tination.”48 According to a U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office report 
in 2007 regarding oil and gas tank-
ers specifically, “successful attacks 
abroad, the expressed desire by ter-
rorists to target U.S. economic inter-
ests, and the potential outcome of a 
terrorist attack on a tanker have led 
Congress and the Administration to 
conclude that protective efforts are 
warranted.”49 The DoD was explic-
itly identified in the report as respon-
sible to maintain “… a credible mar-
itime interdiction capability to deal 
with identified hostile ships at any 
location when authorized to do so.” 
Furthermore, in addition to the DoD, 
the total security activities coordi-
nated among the U.S. Coast Guard, 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and U.S. Department of Home-
land Security were found to be inad-
equate, stressing the need for more 
investment in security: “Much is be-
ing done, both internationally and 
domestically, to protect energy com-
modity tankers and their attendant 
facilities from attack, but notwith-
standing these actions, significant 
challenges may still leave tankers and 
facilities at risk.”49 
The analysis presented in the sec-
tions above, federal law, and these 
statements combine to clearly indicate 
that today, military security is within 
the boundaries of the gasoline pro-
duction process. Whereas previous 
assessments have drawn the bound-
aries with military security on the 
outside of the petroleum life cycle, at-
tributional LCA of GHG emissions 
must now be updated by regula-
tors to reflect that military security is 
within the direct operational bound-
aries of the petroleum supply chain. 
Several studies have estimated 
the fraction of military expenditures 
attributable to securing oil supplies, 
from which we may be able to in-
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fer the fraction of GHG emissions. 
These estimates suggest that $27 to 
$138 billion dollars is spent annu-
ally by the U.S. military for protec-
tion of Middle Eastern maritime oil 
transit routes and oil infrastructure, 
with an average of $84 billion dollars 
per year.50 The most recent analysis 
from the National Priorities Project 
estimates oil-related military costs 
for 2009 based on primary materi-
als including unclassified military 
strategy documents, posture state-
ments, testimony by DoD officials, 
and DoD statistics. Two different 
methods were used in their analysis. 
The first method uses a global force-
planning approach which accounts 
for having to fight two major wars 
simultaneously (e.g. Persian Gulf 
and North Korea), and allocates 40 
percent of U.S. conventional military 
costs to the Middle East, and then at-
tributes 75 percent of those costs to 
oil alone resulting in $97 billion of 
an estimated $517 billion DoD bud-
get of 2009. The second estimate at-
tributes the fraction of three regional 
U.S. Unified Commands (e.g. Cen-
tral, European, and Pacific Com-
mands) to oil security, which results 
in an estimate of $104 billion dollars 
for global protection of oil. Based 
on these two approaches, we there-
fore conclude that about 20 percent 
of the conventional DoD budget is a 
reasonable estimate of the fraction of 
emissions attributable to the objec-
tive of oil security. 
This 20 percent attribution rate 
implies that of the annual conven-
tional military emissions, approxi-
mately 16 MMt CO2e per year can 
be attributed to oil security (see Ta-
ble 3); or 0.2 percent of total U.S. 
emissions at 6957 MMt CO2e in 
2008.51 We estimate that 61 billion li-
ters of gasoline (46.1 percent by vol-
ume) were derived from the 787 mil-
lion barrels of petroleum the United 
States imports per year from the Per-
sian Gulf on average from 2005 to 
2009, so attributing this fraction of 
the Gulf oil security emissions to 
gasoline imports implies that 8.1 g 
CO2e of emissions are associated 
with each megajoule (MJ) of Gulf 
gasoline (Table 3). This is equiva-
lent to roughly 8 percent of the cur-
rent base emissions attributed to a 
MJ of energy in gasoline used in the 
United States. 
In an alternative calculation, the 
consequential LCA approach asks by 
how much these military emissions 
would be reduced if the United States 
were to sufficiently reduce gasoline 
consumption to eliminate Persian 
Gulf imports. It was recently asserted 
that if the United States stopped im-
ports from the region, U.S. military 
infrastructure in the Middle East 
would disappear. Retired U.S. colo-
nel and Boston University professor 
Andrew Bacevich recently stated: 
Imagine the impact just on the Pen-
tagon [DoD] were this country ac-
tually to achieve anything ap-
proaching energy independence. 
U.S. Central Command would go 
out of business. Dozens of bases in 
and around the Middle East would 
close. The navy’s fifth fleet would 
stand down. Weapons contracts 
worth tens of billions would risk 
being canceled.52 
Such a reduction in imports may 
occur over a 20-year timeframe. Pro-
duction of 57 billion liters per year 
(bly) of ethanol from corn, as man-
dated by EISA legislation, would be 
approximately sufficient to substitute 
for the 61 bly of gasoline from Mid-
dle East oil imports averaged from 
2005 to 2009. The elimination of Mid-
dle East oil imports would allow ces-
sation of military oil security activity, 
equivalent to a 20-percent reduction 
in conventional U.S. military activity 
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Table 3. Oil-Related Military GHG Emissions from Gasoline by Attributional and Consequential LCA 
Approaches
                                                              Oil Security,           Oil Security,           Iraq War,             Oil Security +
                                                                      Attrib.                   Conseq.                  Attrib.              Iraq War, Attrib.
Annual oil-related military emissionsa
   (MMt CO2e yr
-1)  34.4  34.4  43.3  77.8
Oil-related military emissions per MJ of gasoline from Persian Gulf imports
U.S. petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf,
   average 2005–2009b (M. bbl yr-1)     787
Gasoline from above imports, at 76.8 liters/barrelc
   (b. liters yr-1)     60.5
Military emissions allocated to gasoline,
   46.1%c of volume (MMt CO2e yr
-1)  15.9   20.0  35.8
Military emissions allocated to gasoline,
   100% of volume (MMt CO2e yr
-1) 34.4
Military emissions per liter of Gulf gasoline
   (g CO2e l
-1)  262  569  331  593
Military emissions per MJ of Gulf gasoline energy,
   at 32.6 MJ per liter (g CO2e MJ
-1)  8.1  17.5  10.1  18.2
Base lifecycle emissions of gasolined
   (g CO2e MJ
-1)  97.7  97.7  97.7  97.7
Military emissions plus base emissions
   (g CO2e MJ
-1)  105.8  115.2  107.8  115.9
Percent increase over gasoline base, %  8%  18%  10%  19%
Oil-related military emissions per MJ for all U.S. gasoline
Total gasoline consumption in the U.S. in 2009
   (b. liters yr-1)e     522
Military emissions per liter of all U.S. gasoline
   (g CO2e l
-1)  30  66  38  69
Military emissions per MJ (g CO2e MJ
-1)  0.9  2.0  1.2  2.1
Military emissions plus base emissions
   (g CO2e MJ
-1)  98.6  99.7  98.9  99.8
Percent increase over gasoline base, %  1.0%  2.1%  1.2%  2.2%
Sources: 
a 20% of conventional emissions, 100% of war emissions in Table 1.
b EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, T.52, accessed online 3/11/2010.
c Average yield of gasoline from petroleum in 2009 = 46.1% (EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, T.34, accessed March 11, 2010).
d note 1.
e Total gasoline supplied 2009, 138 b. gal = 522 b. l (EIA, Petroleum Supply Monthly, T.1, accessed online March 11, 2010).
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and emissions, which in turn is equiv-
alent to 17.5 g CO2e per MJ of gasoline 
energy now imported from the Mid-
dle East (Table 3). If this consequence 
is a plausible and reasonable predic-
tion, regulatory authorities should 
include these indirect military emis-
sions as they compare the GHG con-
sequences of substituting biofuels for 
gasoline from the Persian Gulf. 
We note that this 18 g CO2e per 
MJ of gasoline energy from military 
security is roughly equivalent to the 
14 to 27 g CO2e per MJ currently at-
tributed to corn ethanol energy due 
to consequential indirect land use 
change.53 We further suggest that 
the confidence interval around our 
estimate is comparable to the confi-
dence interval on the latter figures.54 
The key uncertainties in our esti-
mate are associated with the total di-
rect costs of military security for pe-
troleum infrastructure and transit 
routes, including U.S. Coast Guard 
and other agencies (which are likely 
to be greater than our estimate of 
emissions from the military alone); 
emissions from the U.S. military-in-
dustrial complex (an area that has 
recently received little attention); 
and whether the elimination of Mid-
dle East imports would result in a 20 
percent reduction of conventional 
military activity.55 
It can also be argued that imports 
might be reduced by only 50 per-
cent instead of completely, and in 
that case we would expect little if 
any reduction in oil security activ-
ity, given that no less effort may be 
required to provide safe passage for 
half of current ships compared to all 
of them. It can also be argued that if 
the United States reduced or elim-
inated its dedication to oil security 
in the Middle East, another country 
would increase its own efforts for 
that purpose, thus offsetting the cli-
mate change impact of eliminating 
U.S. imports from the area. These 
ambiguities highlight the difficulties 
of predicting human behavior that 
would result from a change in U.S. 
fuel use—difficulties common to 
all consequential LCA analyses. We 
have implicitly excluded those pos-
sibilities as behavioral outcomes— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
assigned probabilities of zero to 
them. To that extent, our evaluation 
is an incomplete analysis on which to 
base fuel policy. We hasten to point 
out, however, that current regulatory 
decisions are already based on simi-
larly incomplete analysis, which re-
sults in an unbalanced consideration 
of the likely impacts of substituting 
one fuel for the other. Specifically, the 
14 to 27 g CO2e per MJ currently at-
tributed to corn ethanol energy due 
to indirect land use change is based 
on the assumption that 57 bly of eth-
anol produced in the United States 
will drive land use change abroad, 
with zero probabilities assigned to al-
ternative outcomes, and zero prob-
ability assigned to the prospect that 
land use regulations or forest reten-
tion programs might alter market-
driven levels of conversions of forests 
to crops as a result of that additional 
production, etc. 
Given that the indirect land use 
emissions currently attributed to 
biofuels and the military security 
emissions attributed here to Gulf 
gasoline are based on similarly in-
complete analyses of alternative be-
havioral outcomes, it would be cor-
rect for the U.S. EPA to include these 
estimates for both fuels. This would 
help base the emissions comparison 
on assessments of single outcome be-
havioral consequences of a change in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fuel use, and so provide a balanced 
assessment of likely consequences 
for climate change. Coincidentally, 
these military emissions due to gas-
oline are roughly equal to land use 
emissions attributed to corn etha-
nol in a hypothetical, but probable, 
future. Yet, this attribution would 
only be accurate for the comparison 
of corn-ethanol with the fraction of 
gasoline derived from Middle East-
ern imports. A comprehensive fuel 
policy should attribute emissions to 
each different source of petroleum, 
as is done for biofuels (gasoline from 
petroleum is currently assigned only 
an average value). 
Iraq War Emissions and U.S. 
Gasoline 
The fraction of Iraq War emis-
sions that should be attributed to the 
use of petroleum is another difficult 
matter to judge. In Table 3, we cal-
culate and report that the amount of 
these emissions is equivalent to 10.1 
g CO2e per MJ of Gulf gasoline con-
sumed in the U.S. (or equivalent to 
1.2 g CO2e per MJ of all gasoline con-
sumed in 2009 as a reference). This 
amounts to 10 percent of the current 
base GHG emissions established for 
gasoline. From an attributional LCA 
viewpoint, based on the economic 
importance of oil and other findings 
discussed above, it is reasonable to 
US Marine Corps CH 53 Helicopter at Camp Korean Village, Iraq. Official U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Capt. 
Paul Greenberg
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attribute perhaps 75 percent to 100 
percent of the war to oil, and 46 per-
cent of this amount to gasoline. But 
so far, little oil has flowed from Iraq 
to the United States. 
From a consequential LCA per-
spective, however, what is relevant 
to future policy is the likely reduc-
tion in war activity that would oc-
cur as a consequence of reduced U.S. 
consumption of gasoline, relative to 
likely war activity with imports con-
tinuing at their current levels. Sup-
pose, for example, that the likeli-
hood of war in the area in the future 
is 15 percent with current U.S. gaso-
line consumption, but only 5 percent 
with no U.S. imports from the Per-
sian Gulf. The expected emissions 
reduction due to this change in pol-
icy would then be 10 percent of 43 
MMt of war-related CO2e emissions, 
equivalent to 1.0 g CO2e per MJ and 
roughly 1 percent of base emissions 
from gasoline. So, given the diffi-
culties of assigning probabilities to 
war in the future, plausible evalua-
tions of these indirect war emissions 
consequentially due to gasoline con-
sumption range from near zero to 10 
percent of base gasoline emissions, 
or perhaps even more. 
Overall military emissions asso-
ciated with gasoline from the Mid-
dle East are then found to range 
from 8.1 to 18.2 g CO2e per MJ, with 
attributional military security alone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
at the low end to attributional mil-
itary security and the Iraq War at 
the high end; the consequential ap-
proach to military security emis-
sions alone is 17.5 g CO2e per MJ. It 
should also be noted that as petro-
leum imports decline, the intensity 
of these emissions would increase 
if expenditures for military security 
were to remain constant. 
Probable Future Military 
Activities for Oil 
Current challenges for the petro-
leum economy include a precarious 
flow of imports, wealth transfer and 
contribution to trade deficits, costly 
military operations, and related in-
ternational terrorism.56 These serious 
economic and national security issues 
have recently stimulated support for 
the development of alternative en-
ergy sources in the United States.57 
In addition to domestic initiatives, 
the U.S. Air Force, the world’s sin-
gle largest consumer of petroleum, 
recently announced a plan to substi-
tute 50 percent of its fuel use with al-
ternative fuels, with particular em-
phasis on biofuels.58 Yet, biofuels 
will be able to supply no more than 
roughly 25 percent of motor fuel in 
the foreseeable future, so other re-
gions where oil supplies are available 
will likely see greater military invest-
ment and intervention. 
Kazakhstan is of interest because 
it has one of the largest oil reserves 
globally (Figure 1), and it is one of 
the top four countries with the great-
est projected increase in production 
capacity over the next 20 years (Ta-
ble 2). Kazakhstan contains three of 
the world’s 10 largest giant oil fields 
(newly discovered), and the coun-
try is now Chevron’s leading source 
of petroleum, currently exported via 
pipelines heading west through Geor-
gia.59 As a corollary to Iraq, U.S. mili-
tary activities in Afghanistan also ap-
pear to be at least partially stimulated 
by oil. Pipelines for transportation of 
oil and gas from Central Asia to the 
Indian Ocean are currently planned 
and have been discussed for at least 
15 years.60 Such potential pipelines 
would transport oil from the Cas-
pian region, bypassing Russia and the 
Turkish Straights, and Iran and the 
Straight of Hormuz (Figure 1). 
In U.S. Congressional testimony 
in 2006, Steven Mann, Principal Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for South 
and Central Asian Affairs at the 
State Department, clearly outlined 
U.S. intentions concerning oil in the 
Afghanistan region: 
Since the independence of the new 
Caspian states 15 years ago, the 
United States has been in the fore-
front of oil and gas development 
in the region, and our efforts are 
paying off.… With the comple-
tion of the first phase of the East-
West Energy Corridor [through 
Georgia], we must now press on 
with the second phase of support-
ing new energy routes out of Cen-
tral Asia.… The United States and 
the countries of the broader region 
share an interest in the free move-
ment of energy, people, goods, 
and information from the Kazakh 
steppes to the Indian Ocean. We 
want not only to support economic 
development along a north–south 
axis, but also afford Afghanistan 
access to a wider world, thus be-
coming a bridge, not a barrier.61 
These explicit activities related to 
oil in the Afghanistan region suggest 
that further emissions related to mil-
itary activity there might reasonably 
be included in the emissions of gaso-
PressTV-Iran
securing foreign oil: military operations & climate change impact of fuels 21
line, if fuel were to pass through that 
region to the U.S. This additional 
case further supports the notion that 
the military is highly engaged in se-
curing foreign oil today. 
The analysis presented here sug-
gests that GHG emissions from mil-
itary activities should be included 
in the GHG intensity of gasoline, as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency implements emissions re-
quirements for biofuels relative to pe-
troleum fuels. For military security 
emissions related to gasoline use, at-
tributional calculations produce a re-
sult nearly half that of consequen-
tial calculations, but there is greater 
uncertainty in allocating additional 
emissions from the Iraq War. 
To accurately determine the de-
gree that biofuels can reduce GHG 
emissions that contribute to cli-
mate change, we must develop a 
better understanding of U.S. mili-
tary GHG emissions related to oil ac-
quisition. U.S. fuel policy must be 
guided by the best possible estimates 
of the GHG consequences of switch-
ing from gasoline to renewable fuels. 
Emissions changes that indirectly re-
sult as consequences of changes in 
policy must surely be included in ra-
tional policymaking, but these emis-
sions can only be estimated with con-
siderable judgment and substantial 
uncertainties. Given that the potential 
GHG implications of future behav-
ioral change may be quite significant 
for changes in gasoline use as well as 
for changes in ethanol use, it is ap-
propriate that they should be consid-
ered by regulatory agencies, as well 
as necessary that they be considered 
as the 2007 EISA legislation directs. 
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